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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEONARD BLACK and VERA JOHNSON, 
also known as Vera Johnson Black, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DAVID F. ANDERSON, Judge of the ) 
Juvenile Court of Washington ) 
County, State of Utah, et al., ) 
Defendants and Appellants ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Case No. 
8234 
The Respondents agree substantially with the 
Statement of Facts as presented by the Appellants 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in their brief. We feel, however, that Appellants• 
Statement of Facts is not sufficiently complete to 
fully appraise the Court of the situation involved. 
The first sentence of Appellants• Statement of Facts 
is as follows: 
"Vera Johnson also lmown as Vera Johnson 
Black is the polygamous wife of Leonard Black and 
from this unlawful relationship there have been 
born eight children ranging, now from eighteen to 
two years of age." 
The marriage of Vera Johnson and Leonard Black 
was entered into in obedience to Section 132 of 
Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints. This relationship was enter-
ed into t.rith the firm understanding and belief that 
said Section 132 is the Word of God, written in 
the hand of Joseph Smith, His Prophet. In living 
in obedience to the admonitions of said Section 132, 
these parents conscientiously felt that they were 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fulfilling a duty imposed upon them by God. 
From this holy relationship there were born 
eight children "ranging, now, from eighteen to 
two years of age." These children have been 
raised in the home maintained by their parents 
in Short Creek, Utah. The rearing given these 
children by their parents has been such that 
the children have never been deprived of any of 
the necessities of life, have always been 
adequately clothed, fed, and housed, and under 
the loving care of their parents they are all 
developing into normal, healthy, intelligent 
citizens of the State of Utah and of the United 
States of America. 
The parents of these children are, in 
matters of religious faith, what are known as 
Fundamentalist Mormons. They, and those who 
profess the same creed, hold to the tenets of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
as that creed stood prior to the issuance and 
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adoption by that church of the so-called "Manifesto" 
of Wilford Woodruff in 1890. They feel in con~ 
science that Mormon Celestial or Plural Marriage 
is the law of God today, even as it was when re-
vealed as an "everlasting" covenant to the Prophet 
Joseph Smith, and that any effort on the part of 
men to change that or any law of God is as noth-
ing, and that such an attempted change by men cart-
not relieve men of the duties imposed upon them 
by the Supreme Law-Giver. Devoutly and sincerely 
these parents entered into this relationship fol-
lowing God's Command, and, in obedience to all 
the laws of marriage and chastity which surround 
and protect Mormon Celestial or Plural Marriage 
from the abuses and excesses which we otherwise 
see about us on every side destroying the sacred-
ness of marriage and the vitality of the American 
family, they have had given to them by God this 
grand family of eight children. 
On page 2 of their brief the Appellants 
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correctly set out what are Findings of Fact 17, 
18, and 19 of the Juvenile Court, as follows: 
"That the home of Leonard Black and 
Vera Johnson Black at Short Creek, Utah, 
is an immoral environment for the rearing 
of said children. 
"That Leonard Black, the father, and 
Vera Johnson B.lack, the mother of said chil-
dren, have each knowingly failed and neglect-
ed to provide for said children the proper 
maintenance, care, training and education 
contemplated and required by both law and 
morals. 
"That both the public welfare and the 
welfare of the children requires that the 
rights of custody and control over said chil-
dren be taken from their parents." 
In this connection it would seem appropriate 
to point out that Finding of Fact 16 of the Juve-
nile Court is as follows: 
"That there was no evidence that any of 
the children were destitute and without 
proper sustenance, clothing or medical care." 
. The Juvenile· Court· :im its ·Finding .of Fact 13 
found that these parents had not been living 
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together as man and wife since July 24, 1953, 
stating that the reason for this beh~vior was 
"not because they have abandoned their religious 
beliefs, but out of fear of criminal or juvenile 
court action involving themselves and their chil-
dren." In other words, from a time prior to the 
time the complaint was filed in the matter before 
the Juvenile Court, continuing through the time 
that court rendered its decision, through the date 
on which the court took the actual custody of 
these children forcibly from the arms of their 
mother, through the present date, these parents 
have not been practicing plural marriage and, 
according to the finding of the Juvenile CoU+t 
have refrained from doing so in deference to 
civil authority, including that of. the Juvenile 
Court itself. 
Findings of Fact 17, 18, and 19 of the Juve-
nile Court, taken in conjunction with the other 
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Findings of Fact, amount to a Conclusion of Law, 
regardless of designation, and that conclusion 
of law is to the effect that the offsp~ing of a 
Mormon Celestial or Plural Marriage living in 
the care and custody of their mother in a home 
maintained by their parents, which parents no 
longer cohabit as man and wife, are, by reason 
of their birth and of the fact that the parents 
still hold to their religious beliefs, neglect-
ed children under the law of this State. 
On pages 2 and 3 of their brief Appellants 
set out certain conditions which the Juvenile 
Court imposed upon these parents as a condition 
for them retaining actual custody of their chil-
dren. To the conditions (a), (b), and (c) set 
out by the Appellants the Juvenile Court in its 
Decree and Judgment had added conditions (d), 
(e), and (f) which, for the convenience of the 
court are a·s follows: 
"(d) That until further order of the 
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court, the parents, and each of them, together 
with all of the children, shall report in per-
son once each month to the probation officer 
or other designated representative of the Court 
at Short Creek, Utah, on the 25th day of each 
month commencing May 25, 1954, unless such 
time and place of reporting be changed with 
the approval of the Court. 
"(e) That until further order of the 
Court, the parents, and each of them, shall 
submit to the Court each month at the times 
mentioned in Paragraph (d) above, a written 
sworn state~ent stating whether or not he or 
she has complied with the conditions set forth 
in subparagraph 3 (a) through (c) above, dur-
ing the preceeding thirty days. 
"(f) That each parent shall file with 
the court on or before May 25th, 1954, a 
sworn statement in writing to the effect that 
he or she is willing to comply with the re-
quirements set forth in sub-paragraph 3 (a) 
through (e) above." 
The conditions required by the Juvenile Court 
amounted to a request to these parents to do an 
affirmative act contravening their faith in God, 
i. e., to deny their faith in God and to deny it 
under oath. The Juvenile Court would have had 
these parents perjure themselves, not only in the 
eyes of the court, but before God, as well. 
For these reasons, the parents complained by 
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writ of habeas corpus, as pointed out by Appel~ 
lants in their brief on page 3. The Appellants, 
on pages 3 and 4 of their brief, set out the 
pertinent portions of the decree of the Honorable 
William Stanley Dunford, Judge, Fourth Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah in and for 
Utah County, complaining of paragraph {b) of 
that decree in which the court restored the 
custody of the subject children to the parents 
"upon the conditions, pending the appeal of the 
above entitled case, that the parents do not live 
together as man and wife, that they retain the 
custody of the children within the geographic 
bounds of the State of Utah and return them to 
this court or to any other court which may have 
jurisdiction at any time that they are ordered by 
said court to do so." The appellants feel, as 
they state on page 4 of their brief, "that the 
district court did err, after having considered 
the legality of the restraint and ruled thereupon, 
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by proceeding thereafter to adjudicate questions 
going to the qualifications and fitness of the 
parents to retain custody of their children." 
Appellants then set out Findings of Fact 7 of the 
District Court which is to the effect that it is 
in the best interests of the children for them to 
be under the custody of their parents. 
The Appellants point out on page 3 of their 
brief that: "This appeal is being taken solely 
for the purpose of determining what the law is, 
in this State, as to matters subject to review 
or collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings." 
The respondents feel that the District Court 
acted properly in this matter in acting in the 
best interests of the children, as it was compelled 
to do under the law of this State, and that its 
action should be sustained by this court on this 
appeal. 
10 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
RESPONDENTS RELY 
Point 1. The Court acted properly in de-
claring the judgment of the Juvenile Court null 
and void as in violation of Amendments One and 
Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States 
of America and of Article One of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
Point 2. The District Court in habeas 
corpus proceedings involving custody of minors 
must act as a court of equity and award custody 
as the best interests of the minors shall indicate, 
hearing and deciding all questions of fact involved 
and making conclusions of law to achieve this end. 
Point 3. The Distri ct Court in restoring 
the custody of the minors involved to their par-
ents acted within its own jurisdiction and in 
obedience to its own duties in such cases and not 
in disturbance of the previously acquired juris-
11 
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diction of the Juvenile Court. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The court acted properly in declar-
ing the judgment of the Juvenile Court null and 
void as in violation of Amendments One and Fourteen 
of the Constitution of the United States of America 
and of Article One of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
This point is intended to squarely controvert 
Point 1 of Appellants' brief. In their argument 
to Point 1 on page 6 of their brief Appellants 
make the following statement& 
"A companion case pending before this 
Honorable Court titled 'State of Utah, in the 
Interest of Elsie Johnson Black, et al.,' seeks 
an adjudication of the constitutionality of 
the judgment of the juvenile court as declared 
void in the proceedings from which we here ap-
peal. Therefore, appellants request the Court's 
permission to waive argument on this Point 1 
for the reason that the said companion case 
will resolve that issue." 
12 
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Respondents agree that the said companion 
case, Case No. 8220, deals with the constitution-
ality of the Decree and Judgment of the Juvenile 
Court. We also request the Court's permission 
to waive argument on this Point 1 "for the reason 
that the said companion case will resolve that 
issue." Respondents wish to point out their 
position that said Decree and Judgment of the 
Juvenile Court is null and void in that it sets 
up requirements which are contrary to the pro-
visions of Sections 1, 4, 7, and 15 of Article 1 
of the Constitution of Utah and Amendments 1 and 
14 of the Constitution of the United States of 
America, in that said requirements violate the 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion. 
Point 2. The District Court in habeas 
Corpus proceedings involving custody of minors 
must act as a court of equity and award custody 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as the best interests of the minors shall indi-
cate, hearing and deciding all questions of fact 
involved and making conclusions of law to achieve 
this end. 
The Appellants cite the cas-e of JONES v. 
MOORE, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) as authority 
for the proposition that "In habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, nothing is inquired into except the 
legality of the restraint." The case may well 
be authority for that proposition, but analysis 
of that case will show that it is more correctly 
authority for the proposition that a proceeding 
involving the custody of minors is one which is 
highly equitable in nat,xre and one which will be 
decided in such a manner as to reflect the best 
interests of the children involved. 
In the case of JONES v. MOORE the plaintiff 
soUght to obtain the custody of his minor daughter, 
under two years of age, which child had been left 
with the defendants, maternal grandparents, since 
14 
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birth. In the original hearing below the defend-
ants won and had an award of custody. Plaintiff, 
however, filed a motion for a new trial and while 
the motion was pending, the judge who heard the 
case was retired from office. The new judge 
granted the motion after counsel had stipulated 
that he should rule on it. After a further 
stipulation to that effect, the new judge ruled 
on the evidence as presented in the original 
hearing and gave custody to the plaintiff father. 
The court in upholding the decision of the lower 
court awarding the custody to the father consider-
ed this question: "Can a case like the one at 
bar be treated as a law case merely?" The court 
answered in the negative, saying that this type 
of a case is an equitable proceeding. The court, 
Mr. Justice Frick writing the opinion, reasoned 
as follows: 
"While it is true that the proceeding, 
in form at least, is habeas corpus proceed-
ing, it is, however, so merely as a matter 
15 
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of convenience to the parties and to expedite 
a hearing upon the issues. No case involving 
the custody of minor children has ever been 
tried or considered in this jurisdiction as 
merely a habeas corpus proceeding, although 
the case in form is such. In habeas corpus 
proceedings nothing is inquired into except 
the legality of the restrain+, and if it be 
found that the petitioner is illegally de-
prived of his liberty, but one conclusion is 
permissible, and that is that the same must 
be restored to him. Where, as here, however, 
the sole issue involved is who shall have the 
custody, care, and education of a child, and 
especially one of tender years the inquiry 
extends far beyond the ordinary issues in-
volved in a habeas corpus proceeding. Cases 
like the one at bar partake of all the inci-
dents of a proceeding in equity. Indeed, 
under our procedure, it has become a pro-
ceeding which is equitable in the highest 
degree, as clearly appears from the decisions 
in all of the cases decided by this court, 
where the right to the custody, nurture, care, 
and education of children was the controlling 
issue. See Stanford v. Gray, 4Z Utah 229, 
12 Pac. 423, Ann. Cas. 1916A., 989: Hummel v. 
Parrish, 43 Utah 3?3, 134 Pac. 898; Harrison 
v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 Pac. 716; Farmer 
v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, 183 Pac. 328; Kurtz 
v. Christensen (Utah} 209 Pac. 340. In view 
of the equitabl~ nature of the proceeding, 
this court, in Harrison v. Harker, supra, 
held that the rule ap~1licable in equity cases 
prevails, namely, that this court must examine 
into the evidence, ~nd, in case the findings 
of the trial court are clearly against the 
evidence, they will not be upheld. In every 
case of this character that has come before 
16 
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this court during the past 17 years while 
the writer has been a member, the proceeding 
has always been considered and treated as 
equitable. The mere fact that such cases 
are commenced under the habeas corpus stat-
ute in order to expedite a speedy hearing 
and determination of the case cannot alter 
the issues involved nor the nature of the 
proceeding. Moreover, from time immemorial 
the chancellors and not the law court have 
determined the controversies respecting the 
care, nurture, education, and custody of 
minor children. The technicalities of the 
law must therefore give way to the more 
important questions, all of which appeal 
most strongly to the conscience of the 
chancellor. To that effect are all of the 
decisions. There is therefore - there can 
be - no merit to the contention that these 
cases should be treated merely as law 
cases, ••••" 
The court in this case clearly quoted the 
general rule as cited by the Appellants but, in 
the language just set out, then went on to point 
out that in cases involving the "custody, nurture, 
care, and education of children" the court will 
look "far beyond the ordinary issues involved 
in a habeas corpus proceeding." The Respondents 
concede that the District Court in the instant 
case went beyond the usual scope of inquiry in 
17 
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habeas corpus matters, but it did so because it 
was required to do so by the very nature of the 
case it was considering. The District Court was 
bound to inquire, in the nature of an inquiry as 
by a court of equity, as to all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the custody of the minors 
whose disposition it was, by the proceeding, called 
upon to decide. 
Such an inquiry is by its very nature bound 
to be a broad one. That it should be so broad 
as to involve consideration by the District Court 
of much the same facts and circumstances as would 
be considered qy the Juvenile Court in a case of 
alleged neglect is not surprising. 
In speaking of the meaning of the term "best 
interests" of the child as being determinative or 
the courts' proper judgment in matters of this 
nature, the court in the JONES case said, 
"Without now pausing to go into the ques-
tion of what may be involved within the term 
'best interests', it must suffice to say that 
18 
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that term as it is understood and applied 
in cases like the one at bar has reference 
more particularly to the moral welfare than 
to mere comforts, benefits, or advantages 
that wealth can give. If such were not the 
case, poor parents could not sustain their 
right to the custody of a child in which a 
rich man has taken a special interest, and 
where between himself and the cl,.ild there 
exists a strong liking or affection. It is 
the comparatively poor and not the rich par-
ents who rear the large fa~ilies and who 
give to the world a large majority of the 
men and women who conduct its affairs. Un-
less, therefore, a parent has by his acts 
and conduct in some way forfeited or lost 
the right to custody of his minor child the 
presumptions respecting his right to have 
such custody are all in his favor. If the 
cases of this character heretofore decided 
by this court are critically examined, it 
will be found that such is the spirit that 
pervades all of them ••• " 
It is readily seen that the duty of deter-
mining, in cases of this sort, what is in the 
best interests of the children is a very partie-
ular and highly important duty. It is easy to 
conceive that the District Court in making this 
inquiry may have uncovered certain facts which 
did not come to the attention of the Juvenile 
Court which compelled it to come to a legal 
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conclusion at complete variance to that arrived 
at by the Juvenile Court. Could the District 
Court escape its judicial duty of considering 
what was to the best interests or the children by 
pointing to the fact that the Juvenile Court make 
certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
with reference to the family before it in a 
matter brought before that Juvenile Court on a 
petition alleging neglect? The rule of the JONES 
case indicates no circumstance or set of circum-
stances under which the District Court, in a habeas 
corpus proceeding properly brought before it in~ 
volving the custody of minors, may escape this 
obligation. 
The rule of the JONES case is still the rule 
by which the courts of this State are bound. The 
JONES case was reaffirmed by the case of CHAPMAN 
v. GRAHAM, ____ Utah ____ , 270 P. (2d) 821 (1954). 
In this case Chapman had obtained a writ of habeas 
corpus releasing him from confinement at the State 
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Prison. The writ was granted on grounds that 
Chapman had been subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment, in that, the prison officials had 
refused to permit him to return to the Mayo Clinic 
in Minnesota for certain surgery. Chapman had 
previously been paroled so that he might undergo 
treatment at the Mayo Clinic but had been return-
ed to prison for a parole violation. This court 
on the appeal ruled that Chapman had not been 
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and 
that he should not have been discharged as a re-
sult of the habeas corpus proceeding. This court 
also held that the lower court under the circum-
stances should have made the discharge conditional. 
In the opinion of the court written by Mr. 
Justice Henroid, the function of the writ of habeas 
corpus is dealt with as follows: 
"Use of the writ in a case like this 
would pierce and wound the administrative 
processes of constitutionally created execu-
tive agencies with a habeas corpus lance 
thrust by the judiciary. Almost universally 
such use has been condemned, and the function 
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of habeas corpus has been confined to a 
single test: That of legality of restraint 
(Coburn v. Schroeder, 71 Olk. Cr. 405, 112 
P. 2d 191; Kauble v. Haynes, D. c., 64 F. 
Supp. 153; Sarshik v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 142 
F. 2d 676; Edmondson v. Warden, 194 Md. 707, 
69 A. 2d. 919; Ex parte Pickens, D. c., 101 
F. Supp. 285; Siegel v. Ragen, D. c., 88 F. 
Supp. 996. Contra: Harper v. Wall, D. c., 
85 F. Supp. 783.), even to the exclusion of 
those cases where an individual's health has 
been shown to be in jeopardy. We have adopt-
ed such view in Jones v. Moore, 1923, 61 Utah 
383, 213 P. 191, 193, where we said that 'In 
habeas corpus proceedings nothing is inquired 
into except the legality of the restraint.' 
We re-affirm that principle as it applies to 
cases like this and as applied to child cus-
tody cases where the welfare of children may 
lend a different complexion to, but not a 
basic difference in the principle ••• 
"We prefer to adhere to the principle, 
until that rare case approaches which to 
date we have not encountered, that courts, 
b,y means of the writ, will not interfere with 
the management, control or internal affairs, 
nor will they, nor can they substitute their 
judgment in discretionary matters for those 
of administrative agencies of a different 
department of government. • • " 
This case, as is pointed out by the Appel!'"" 
lants is authority for the general rule that, "In 
habeas coTpUs proceedings nothings is inquired 
into except the legality of the restraint." The 
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The court said that it reaffirmed "that principle 
as it applied to cases like this and as applied 
to child custody cases where the welfare of chil-
dren may lend a different complexion to, but not 
a basic difference in the principle ••• " The 
court there recognizes the peculiar nature of 
cases involving the custody of ch~ldren. They 
are cases in which "the welfare of children may 
lend a different complexion to, but not a basic 
difference in the principle." The court did not 
overrule the JONES case, but, rather, it seems 
to have emphasized the rule of that case. It 
seems to have pointed out the obvious, that, in 
cases involving the custody of children, the 
inquiry as to the legality of the restraint must 
go far and beyond the inquiry made in an ordinary 
habeas corpus matter. Naturally, the very 
broad scope of such an inquiry might lead one to 
feel that these cases are outside the rule; 
however, as the court so carefully points out 
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"the welfare of children" in these cases "may 
lend a different complexion to, but not a basic 
difference in the principle." 
When the District Court in the instant case 
inquired into the fitness of these parents to 
have the care and custody of these children, it 
did so in order to determine whether these chil-
dren were illegally restrained. In making its 
inquiry it must be governed by the rules con-
straining all courts. It must get the facts, 
make its findings and draw its legal conclusions. 
The District Court in this case made its inquiry. 
It had witnesses before it, it listened to their 
testimony. The District Court then made its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law while 
cognizant of the fact that it was required to act 
under the cases ~s in the nature of a court of 
equity and in the best interests of the children. 
The rule of the JONES case, that cases in-
volving the custody of minors are cases equitable 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in nature which must be decided in the best 
interests of the children involved, has been 
followed and reenunciated in all cases where these 
questions have been raised. We note a few of 
these cases in passing. 
WALLICK v. VANCE, 76 Utah 209, 289 P. 103 
(1930) was a case in which the father of a 
minor child appealed from a decree of the lower 
court awarding custody of his daughter to her 
aunt, the father's sister. The court in that 
case, having the question of custody of a minor 
before it, upheld the lower court in its action 
in deciding the question of c~tody so as to best 
serve the child's welfare and interests. 
HARDCASTLE v. HARDCASTLE, 118 Utah 192, 221 
P. (2d) 883 (1950), although not a habeas corpus 
matter but a matter involving a petition to modi-
fy a divorce so as to obtain custody of a minor 
child, is another case in which the best interests 
of the child was the decisive issue in the case. 
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In IN RE BRADLEY, 109 Utah 539, 167 P. (2d) 
978, (1946), the mother of a minor child appealed 
from the Juvenile Court's denial of her petition 
that the custody be returned to her. The Supreme 
Court upheld the Juvenile Court but ruled, on page 
984 (P.), as follows: 
"Before determining this question we 
call attention to the fact that cases involv-
ing the custody of a child are cases in equity 
and this court is required to determine the 
facts as well as the law. Harrison v. Harker, 
supra; Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 
191; Jensen v. Earley, supra; Wallick v. Vance, 
76 Utah 209, 289 P. 103." 
In BALDWIN v. NIELSON, 110 Utah 172, 170 P. 
(2d)l79 (1946), the rehearing of which case appears 
in the reports at 110 Utah 180, 174 P. (2d) 437 
(1946), a father by habeas corpus sought custody 
of his minor son from the family of the child's 
deceased mother. In agreeing with the decision of 
the lower court awarding custody to the father, the 
court in both opinions followed the rule that in 
cases of this kind the most important consideration 
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is what will be for the best interests and 
welfare of the child. 
WALTON v. COFFMAN, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. (2d) 
97 (1946) is a habeas corpus case involving the 
custody of a minor. The court said it was an 
equity case. The court, Mr. Justice Wade writing 
the opinion, on page lOO(P.), went into the 
question of the office of the writ of habeas 
corpus in cases involving the custody of chil-
dren, as follows: 
"Under the English Common law, original-
ly, the writ of habeas corpus was used only 
in cases of arrest or forceable restraint 
under claim of authority of law. Later it 
was broadened to cover all kinds of cases 
where one person forceably restrained another 
of his liberty whether under claim of author-
ity of law or not and in cases where the 
restraint was such that the person restrained 
was unable to make application in person for 
the writ, other persons were allowed to do 
so in his behalf and this applied in cases 
of children as well as adults. In all of 
these cases originally, at least in theory, 
if the court found that there was unlawful 
restraint, it merely ordered the person freed 
from the restraint. But in cases of small 
children unable to exercise mature judgment 
in such matters, who are always the wards of 
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someone, they were held to be the wards of 
courts of equity, and such courts tried out 
the question, usually, of which of two con-
tending parties should have the custody of 
the child. In so doing, courts of equity, 
as the sovereign power exercising the king's 
conscience, made the choice for the child, 
and placed the child in the custody of the 
person where its best interests and welfare 
would be subserved. This jurisdiction of 
equity had developed long before the Ameri-
can revolution ••• This jurisdiction has 
been followed in the states and it is gen-
erally held that the determining factor is 
the best interest and welfare of the child ••• " 
The District Court in the instant case was 
faced with a situation in which both plaintiffs 
and defendants claimed they should have the care 
and custody of these children. Confronted with 
this situation in a habeas corpus matter what was 
the court required to do? First of all, it had 
to inquire into the legality of the restraint. 
It had to answer at the very beginning the ques-
tion as to whether these children were properly 
being held by the parties designated to care for 
them by the Utah State Department of Public Welfare. 
In answering that question, it had to determine 
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whether the decision of the Juvenile Court award-
ing the custody of these children to the Utah 
State Department of Public Welfare was a correct 
one, and if it were an imporper decision, were 
its faults such as might be corrected on appeal 
or were they such as to result in a void judgment 
by the Juvenile Court. If, as found by the Dis-
trict Court, the judgment of the Juvenile Court 
was so violative of human rights guaranteed ~ 
the Constitution of United States of America 
and by the Constitution of the State of Utah as 
to be utterly void, the court then had no alter-
native; it had to release the children from the 
unlawful restraint. 
It seems to be the position of the Appellants 
as expressed in their brief that the District 
Court should have stopped with the discharge, 
that it should not have restored the custody of 
the children to their parents and especially that 
it should not have inquired into the fitness of 
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the parents to have the care and custody of their 
children. Having determined that the Decree and 
Judgment under which the children were being re-
strained was unconstitutional and void and being 
faced with the necessity of discharging the chil-
dren, the District Court then had a situation before 
it wherein children, who had been taken from the 
custody of their parents and placed in the custody 
of the State Department of Public Welfare, were now 
to be discharged from the custody of that depart-
ment. Was the District Court free, then to dis-
charge these children, minors of tender age, and 
to place them in the custody of no one, or did 
it have the obligation as a court of equity to 
consider the fact that these minors should be 
placed in the custody of persons capable of taking 
care of them and to decide the question as to who 
were the proper persons to have custody? 
The question would seem logically to answer 
itself. The District Court, as a court of equity, 
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could not have released these children from the 
illegal restraint imposed upon them by the Juve-
nile Court and have provided for them nothing 
further. There was no way for the District Court 
to evade the obvious question: Who are the prop-
er parties to have the custody of these children? 
There is always a presumption in favor of the 
parents when such a question is presented. The 
parents were before the Court seeking the custody 
of their children. The Court had the clear obli-
gation of determining the fitness of the parents 
to have custody. This it did, and it restored 
the custody of the children to the parents. Cer-
tainly, its Findings of Fact on this issue are at 
variance with those made by the Juvenile Court. 
The Findings of Fact of the District Court are 
clearly supported by the evidence presented be-
fore it. Even the Appellants do not dispute this 
fact. The District Court would not have been able 
to have ignored the evidence presented before it 
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and have refused these parents the care and custody 
of their children and to have given as its reason 
for doing so the fact that the Juvenile Court had 
determined that these parents were unfit. The 
District Court was certain from the testimony of 
the witnesses who had appeared before it that these 
parents were the proper persons to have the care and 
custody of their children. It had no alternative 
but to restore that custody to those parents. 
The Appellants conclude that the District 
Court had no right to consider the matter of the 
parents' fitness to have the custody of their 
children, and they cite on page 7 of their brief 
the case of EX PARTES. H., 1 Utah (2d) 186, 264 
P. (2d) 850 (1953) as authority for the proposition 
nthat matters reviewable on appeal, but which do 
not go to the juvenile court's jurisdiction are not 
subject to review or collateral attack in habeas 
corpus proceedings." 
In the case of EX PARTES. H., a 13 year old 
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boy had been sent to the Industrial School by the 
Juvenile Court. His mother sought a writ of habeas 
corpus in the court below on grounds that (1) he 
was too young, (2) there was no finding that she 
was unfit to have his custody and (3) that her 
son was returned to the school without a hearing 
after he had been allowed to return to his mother. 
The questions presented to the Court were: 
{1) Are (1) and (2) above proper subjects of 
inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings? and (2) 
Is a hearing necessary before returning a child 
on probation to the Industrial School? 
The Court held in this case that inquiry as 
to (1) and (2) should properly be on appeal and 
that a hearing was not necessary before return-
ing a child to the Industrial School but the 
authorities must have good reason for doing so 
and the burden of proving lack of good reason is 
on the perso~ so contending, proof of which lack 
must be clear and convincing. 
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The reasoning of the Court on these points, 
Mr. Justice Henroid writing, is as follows: 
"As to (1) and (2): These matters are 
reviewable on appeal, but do not go to the 
Juvenile Court's jurisdiction, and are not 
subject to review or collateral attack in 
habeas corpus proceedings (u.s. v. Valante, 
264 U.S. 563, 44 S. Ct. 411, 68 L. Ed. 850). 
As to (3): Under our statutes the Public 
Welfare Commission, and hence its agency, 
the Industrial School, has continuing juris-
diction over a committed child, and may expand 
and contract the walls of the institution as 
the welfare of the child dictates (64-6-8 u. 
C.A.). However, it could not be construed to 
operate as a device for oppression, and this 
court, in a proper case, would not hesitate 
to intercede if it faced a situation where the 
authorities had acted under the statute with-
out good reason, capriciously or arbitrarily. 
There appears to be no proof of any such un-
reasonableness in the record here. 
"'In this case an offer of proof was made 
with respect to the fitness of the mother, but 
none as to the unreasonableness of the School 
authorities' action, the petition having stat-
ed only in the form of a conclusion that the 
boy had been returned without a 'legal hear-
ing', and the matter having been made the 
subject of but a brief colloquy between court 
and counsel. Consequently, the trial court 
was justified in refusing to entertain juris-
diction in a habeas corpus proceeding, to 
review the merits of the case before the Juve-
nile Court. There is no question but that the 
Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over 
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children 13 years of age, and over the sub-
ject matter relating to parents• fitness 
to have custody. In truth, the Juvenile 
Court enjoys far wider jurisdiction and 
very well may commit a delinquent to the 
Industrial School for cause even though 
his parents are eminently fitted to have 
its custody." 
It should be noted that in EX PARTE S. H. 
we have a case where a juvenile delinquent has 
been committed to the Industrial School. The 
instant case is one in which children have been 
taken from their parents because of the alleged 
neglect by the parents. The matters not proper 
for consideration in a habeas corpus action with 
reference to the particular situation appearing 
in EX PARTE S. H. were whether the juvenile was 
to young and the question of the fitness of the 
mother to have his custody. The Court pointed 
out that there was no question that the Juvenile 
Court had jurisdiction over children 13 years 
of age and that the Juvenile Court could "commit 
a delinquent to the Industrial School for cause 
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even though his parents are eminently fitted to 
have its custody." The holding in that case that 
the matters considered "do not go to Juvenile 
Court's jurisdiction and are not subject to 
review or collateral attack in habeas corpus pro-
eeedingsn does not mean that the District Court 
in the instant case was wrong in considering 
the fitness of the parents to have the custody 
of their children after it had determined that 
the children were being restrained under a void 
Decree and Judgment. 
The Appellants point out, on page 8 of their 
brief, that confusion has arisen from the case 
of JENSEN v. SEVY, 103 Utah 220, 134 P. (2d) 1081 
(1943). The case would seem to be of sufficient 
importance to merit a more detailed analysis. 
The Juvenile Court had with consent of the 
plaintiff father entered an order declaring his 
daughter a ward of the court and dividing her 
custody on a semi-annual basis between her grand-
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parents, the mother having died. When the plain-
tiff remarried, he sought custody. The Juvenile 
Court then issued an order to the effect that if 
the plaintiff's behavior was proper until a cer-
tain date he could then have custody, the juvenile 
court expressly retaining jurisdiction. Plaintiff 
appealed that order. The date having passed be-
fore the appeal was heard, the plaintiff applied 
to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus; 
the court issued the writ and made it returnable 
before District Judge, John L. Sevy, Jr. Judge 
Sevy refused to consider the matter and dis-
missed the writ. Plaintiff then applied to the 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus requiring 
Judge Sevy to hold a hearing on the writ of 
habeas corpus. The court issued an alternative 
writ requiring the judge to hold the hearing or 
show cause. The judge elected to show cause. 
The court itself posed 5 questions for decision. 
Question 5 is as follows: 
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"Is the jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Court over minors so exclusive as to divest 
the Supreme Court or the District Courts of 
jurisdiction, to inquire qy habeas corpus, 
into the legality of the restraint of a 
ward of the Juvenile Court, exercised by 
any person, either under an order of the 
Juvenile Court or otherwise?" 
Three opinions were filed in the case. The 
portions of them dealing with this question are 
set out. The opinion of Mr. Justice Larson is in 
part as follows: 
"The District Court was mindful of the 
provisions of Sec. 14-7-4, R. S. u. 193.3 
which reads: 'The juvenile court shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases 
relating to the neglect, dependency and de-
linquency of children •••• , and the custody, 
detention, guardianship of the person •••• of 
such •••• children. ' (Italics added) • And 
subdivision (3) of the section which reads: 
'When jurisdiction shall have been acquired 
by the court in the case of any child, such 
child shall continue for the purposes of 
such case under the jurisdiction of the 
court ••• 1 
"'(4) Nothing herein contained shall 
deprive other courts of the right to deter-
mine the custody of children upon writs of 
habeas corpus ••••• Such other courts ~Y.! 
however, decline to pass upon questions or 
custody and may certify the same to the 
juvenile court for hearing and determination 
or recommendation.' (Italics added). And 
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that pursuant to such statute he intended 
the order to be that he 'declined to pass 
upon questions of custody' and left the 
same for determination by the Juvenile 
Court... The District Court concluded 
that since petitioner admitted he had not 
made a showing to the Juvenile Court as 
provided in its order, he was not entitled 
to custody under the order of the Juvenile 
Court; and since the order itself was valid, 
he was not entitled to custody in derogation 
of it. It held therefor that the detention 
of the child by the grandparents was lawful 
and under valid legal process; that the right 
to modify the Juvenile Court order lay only 
in that court or in the Supreme Court by 
appeal, and therefor petitioner was not en-
titled to have the child discharged from 
the custody of its grandparents. In this 
we think the District Court was right and 
the alternative writ of mandamus is recalled 
and quashed." Moffat, J. concurred. 
Wolfe, C. J. concurred in the result, but said: 
"The opinion of Judge Hoyt expresses rrry 
opinion on the reason and interpretation of 
the action of the District Court in refusing 
to take jurisdiction of the question raised 
by the writ of habeas corpus and the intention 
of the District Court in dismissing the writ. 
It also expresses my opinion that where the 
Juvenile Court has obtained jurisdiction of 
a child because of neglect, dependency or 
delinquency, the District Court must dismiss 
the writ. It is not discretionary. The 
orders of the Juvenile Court are appealed to 
this court under Sec. 14-7-33, Utah Code Ann. 
1943, and the judgment of the Juvenile Court 
39 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cannot be overturned by suing out a writ and 
obtaining a hearing on the very same issue 
by that method either in the District or the 
Supreme Court." 
Hoyt, D. Judge, concurred in the result, 
but said 
n ••• I think it reasonable clear that 
what the court did was to hear the habeas 
corpus matter and, finding that the child 
involved had been taken into the custody of 
the· Juvenile Court, because of neglect or 
misconduct of the father (petitioner) and 
that the juvenile court had retained juris-
diction of the matter, the district court 
concluded, and I think rightly, that it 
had no jurisdiction to take the child from 
the custody of the juvenile court or to 
determine the question of the father's 
fitness to have his child returned to him ••• 
n ••• I think it was the inte-ntion of 
the district court to hold that it had no 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the 
question of the father's fitness and qual-
ification to have his child returned to him. 
I cann~t agree with .. the_ holding inf~r- · 
able from the opinion that the district court 
could have proceeded to hear and determine 
that question. In my opinion it was not a 
matter of discretion. I think the legis-
lature intended to confer exclusive original 
jurisdiction upon the juvenile court to 
determine such questions in every case where-
in the state had become a party by the juve-
nile court taking custody of a child because 
of neglect or delinquency. The provisions 
of subsection 4 of section 14-7-4 R. S. re-
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lating to powers of courts to determine 
questions of custody in habeas corpus pro-
deedings should not, in my opinion, be con-
strued to apply to cases in which the state 
has become a party by intervention of the 
juvenile court. Unless we so construe it 
we cannot reasonably give effect to the 
provision of subsection 3 of section 14-7-4 
that 'when jurisdiction shall have been ac-
quired by the court in the case of any child, 
such child shall continue for the purposes 
of such case under the jurisdiction of the 
court until he becomes twenty-one years of 
age, unless discharged prior thereto or un-
less he is committed to the state industrial 
school or to the district court as hereinafter 
provided •••• 1 
"It is a sufficient answer to a writ of 
habeas corpus to show that a child is held 
pursuant to the terms of a valid order made 
after due notice and hearing qy· the juvenile 
court in a case in which the juvenile court 
had jurisdiction •••• To hold otherwise is 
to hold that by reason of subsection 4 of 
Section 14-7-4 R.S. the district courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile 
courts in cases of alleged neglect of chil-
dren. I cannot believe that it was so 
intended." 
The confusion resulting from the case may well 
spring from the fact that the opinion of Mr. Justice 
Larson, concurred in by Mr. Justice Moffat, is 
found first in the reports, while the opinion of 
Chief Justice Wolfe concurring in the result but 
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the reasoning of Judge Hoyt is next in order, 
followed by the opinion of Judge Hoyt concurring 
in the result but employing reasoning differing 
from that of Mr. Justice Larson, Judge Hoyt's 
opinion being concurred in by Mr. Justice 
McDonough. 
A great deal of the confusion, however, 
may arise from a failure to note these words of 
Judge Hoyt: 
~It is a sufficient answer to a writ 
of habeas corpus to show that a child is held 
pursuant to the terms of a valid order made 
after due notice and hearing b.Y the juvenile 
court in a case in which the juvenile court had 
jurisdiction." 
The order must be a valid order. In the in-
stant case the order was invalid. It was void. 
It was an order violating constitutional guarantees 
of human freedom and was in excess of the juris-
diction of the Juvenile Court to make. If we agree 
that the opinion of Judge Hoyt is the prevailing 
opinion of the court in the JENSEN v. SEVY case, 
we must still conclude that such did not preclude 
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the District Court from proceeding as it did in 
the instant case. 
Section 55-10-5 (4), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953} is as follows: 
"Nothing herein contained shall deprive 
other courts of the right to determine the 
custody of children upon writs of habeas 
corpus, or when such custody is incidental 
to the determination of causes in such courts. 
Such other courts may, however, decline to 
pass upon questions of custody and may certi-
fy the same to the juvenile court for hear-
ing and determination or recommendation." 
Even without such a provision the statute 
conferring jurisdiction on the juvenile courts 
could not have constitutionally infringed upon the 
power of courts generally to protect cit~zens from 
illegal restraint by use of the writ of habeas 
corpus. This provision appearing in the statute, 
there can be no contention that the legislature, 
in giving the juvenile courts exclusive juris-
diction of cases of neglect or delinquency of 
children, intended to infringe upon the traditional 
authority of the courts to act with the power of 
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the writ of habeas corpus in cases appropriate for 
its exercise. 
The JENSEN v. SEVY case is certainly not 
authority for the proposition that the District 
Courts may never intervene by means of the writ 
of habeas corpus after the Juvenile Courts have 
acted in a matter involving the neglect, dependency, 
or delinquency of children. To use the example 
and language of Judge Dunford in his Memorandum 
Decision in the instant case, 
"In plain reason it could not be con-
tended that the rule would prevent inter-
vention of the Supreme Court by means of 
Habeas Corpus under all, or any, conditions, 
Could that decision be reasonably interpreted 
as holding that if a Juvenile Court so far 
departed from reason that in a charge of 
dependency of a five-year old child, he sent-
enced it to 20 years in the State penitentiary, 
and the executive officers were likewise so 
bereft that they executed the judgment, that 
the child would have to languish in an insti-
tution for felons while the slower processes 
of appeal were made effective? It doesn't 
seem so, Clearly in such circumstances, 
Habeas Corpus would lie, because such a judg-
ment would transcend all legal authority of 
the court and its officers, and would be in 
gross violation of the Constitutional rights 
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of the child. Such a situation would be 
quite distinctive from a mere irregularity, 
such as failing to set and notice a hearing 
of a claimed violation of probation which 
cannot be reviewed upon Habeas Corpus as 
held by our court in Stoker v. Gowans, 147 
P. 911. 
"Habeas Corpus has always been, and may 
always be, resorted to to protect the Consti-
tutional rights of an individual under un-
lawful distraint, even though there may also 
exist a right of correction by appeal when 
the distraint results from an unlawful or 
void judgment." 
The logic of this position seems incont~o-
vertible. 
The Appellants, on page 9 of their brief, 
suggest that the "discharge of the children could 
have been made conditional by the court, either 
upon review of the holding of the district court 
or upon the outcome of an appeal from the finding, 
as to neglect, of the juvenile court. CHAPMAN v. 
GRAHAM, supra."· 
In the CHAPMAN case, the criminal case dis-
cussed above, the court spoke of such a condi-
tional discharge in the opinion written by Mr. 
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Justice Henroid as follows: 
"In passing, we are constrained to 
suggest that in this case the trial court more 
properly could have made the petitioner's 
discharge conditional upon affirmance by us 
or upon failure of appeal within the pre-
scribed time, or knowing that this prisoner 
would depart the state posthaste upon his 
release admitted him to bail in order to 
assure his return to proper custody should 
this court happen to disagree, as we have, 
with the trial court. Both procedures we 
have approved (Dickson v. Mullings, 66 Utah 
282, 241 P. 840), although we are aware 
that a different conclusion was reached in 
early cases touching the matter. (41 Harv. 
Law Rev.)" 
In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Crockett 
felt that if there had been cruelty, 
"The Court could very well order a 
discontinuance of the cruelty. The prisoner's 
discharge would not be indicated unless that 
was the only way to relieve the situation. 
At most, the discharge could be conditioned 
upon failure to comply with the order to cor-
rect it. The remedy would not be to per-
emtorily grant the prisoner's release •• " 
Reasons for making a discharge conditional 
in a case such as the CHAPMAN case may well not 
be present in a case such as the instant case. 
There would seem to have been nothing to indicate 
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in the instant case that the children were going 
to be spirited out of the jurisdiction of our 
courts or that they would not be voluntarily 
surrendered to our courts upon request to the 
parents that they do so. It would seem, none-
theless, that the District Court did make its 
judgment conditional. In its judgment quoted 
by the Appellants, on page 4 of their brief, 
the District Court restored the custody of the 
children to the parents "upon the conditions, 
pending the appeal of the above entitled case, 
that the parents do not live together as man 
and wife, that they retain the custody of the 
children within the geographic bounds of the 
State of Utah and return them to this court 
or to any other court which may have juris-
diction at any time that they are ordered by 
said court to do so." Not only did the Dis-
trict Court make its discharge conditional as 
suggested by the CHAPMAN case, but it was care-
ful not to disturb the jurisdiction of any other 
47 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court. The District Court made no attempt to 
deprive the Juvenile Court of its continuing 
jurisdiction which it obtained by virtue of 
the statute. 
The District Court in the action taken by 
it in the instant case, in considering the ques-
tion of fitness of the parents to have custody 
of their children, did not disturb the previous-
ly acquired jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, 
but was, in fact, most careful not to do so. 
In making the inquiry it made, the District Court 
did nothing more than perform the obligation 
imposed upon the district courts whenever they 
have before them a matter involving the q~stody 
of children. 
POINT 3. The District Court in restoring 
the custody of the minors involved to their par-
ents acted within its own jurisdiction and in 
obedience to its own duties in such cases and not 
48 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in disturbance of the previously acquired juris-
diction of the Juvenile Court. 
The jurisdiction of the District Court in 
cases in which it must decide the custody of chil-
dren, as has been discussed under Point 2, is the 
jurisdiction of a court of equity charged with 
making its decision in the best interests of the 
children involved. In exercising this jurisdic-
tion the District Court does not infringe upon 
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. It may 
differ in its findings with the Juvenile Court, 
but it acts as an independent court upon the 
evidence and testimony presented before it. 
No one can disagree with the statement of 
the Appellants, on page 11 of their brief, "that 
had there been no question raised as to the le-
gality of the restraint of these children, the 
Honorable Court below would have dismissed the 
writ;" Legality of the restraint is the basic 
issue presented in any habeas corpus proceeding. 
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If there is no illegal restraint, there can be 
no relief by habeas corpus. 
The Appellants then continue, on page 11 of 
their brief, to state that the District Court 
would have dismissed the writ •upon the ground 
that the issues raised (as to the parents• fit-
ness, right to custody, neglect, delinquency, 
etc.) were not subject to review in habeas corpus 
p~oceedings. This is the well established law 
of this State." 
This latter statement would give one the 
impression that under no circumstances could 
these issues ever be raised by means of a 
habeas corpus proceeding. The Appellants are 
apparently asking this court to so declare. 
The lives of little children should be 
tampered with by the State for only the gravest 
reasons. It children are taken from their 
parents for reasons insufficient to empower 
the Juvenile Court to so disrupt their lives, 
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other courts will, and should intervene by habeas 
corpus to protect the fundamental human rights 
inherently possessed by every citizen of this State 
and of the United States of America, whether such 
citizens be adults or minors. 
Surely it is not the law of this State, that 
should a Juvenile Court declare parents unfit and 
take the custody of their children from them by mak-
ing a finding of neglect when it has had before it 
not one iota of evidence to support such a find-
ing, that the District Courts and the Supreme 
Court are powerless to invoke the great protect-
ing arm of the age-old writ of habeas corpus to 
release such children and return them to their 
parents but that the children and the parents 
must await the slow, tedious processes of appeal 
to be restored to a condition from which they 
should never have been removed in the first place. 
The lives of our children are too precious. 
Irreparable harm can be done a child by forcibly 
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tearing it from its mother's arms, even for an 
instant. Irreparable harm was undoubtedly done 
to the Black children by being forcibly torn from 
their home and parents even for the short period 
of one week, as happened in the instant case. 
The kind of a decision which the Appellants ask 
this court to make is one which could make tyrants 
of juvenile judges and which could ruin the lives 
of countless honorable citizens of this State. 
Think of the heartaches, of the broken homes, of 
the tortured minds of children which might result 
should a Juvenile Court decide to take the custody 
of children from their parents for reasons not in 
the record, if that court's finding, under any 
circumstances, for any reasons, regardless of 
how arbitrary and abusive that court might be of 
human liberties, could never be challenged save 
by the method of appeal. The office _of the writ 
of habeas corpus to relieve from unlawful restraint 
in order to prevent irreparable harm would be 
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destroyed. 
The writ of habeas corpus is one of the 
oldest safeguards of human liberty born of Eng-
lish Jurisprudence. Its strength is not to be 
lightly sapped. Its great protecting arm is 
not to be strapped behind Justice's back. 
Human liberties are not so casually to be 
trampled into the dust. 
The general rule, of course, is that a writ 
of habeas corpus cannot be utilized for the pur-
pose of proceedings in error. 
EX PARTE HUDGINS, 249 U.S. 378, 39 S. Ct• 
337 (1919) throws some light on the office of 
the writ of habeas corpus when exceptional cir-
cumstances are presented. In this case the Dis-
trict Judge had sentenced a witness for contempt, 
the Judge feeling that the witness was failing 
to tell the truth on the witness stand. The writ 
of habeas corpus having been brought in the U. S. 
Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice White in his 
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opinion considered the general rule with respect 
to the application of the writ of habeas corpus 
and found that the District Court under the facts 
of the case had exceeded its power and that habeas 
corpus did properly lie. The opinion on page 384 
{U. S.) states as follows: 
"In view of the nature of the case, of 
the relation which the question which it 
involves bears generally to the power and 
duty of courts in the performance of their 
functions, of the dangerous effect on the 
liberty of the citizen when called upon as 
a witness in a court which might result if 
the erroneous doctrine upon which the order 
under review was based were not promptly 
corrected, we are of opinion that the case 
is an exception to the general rules of pro-
cedure to which we have at the outset re-
ferred, and therefore that our duty exacts 
that we finally dispose of the questions in 
the proceeding for habeas corpus which is 
before us." 
Another case in which the office of the writ 
is discussed is SUNAL v. LARGE, 332 u.s. 174, 67 
s. Ct. 1588, 91 L. Ed. 1982, (1947). The case 
involved convictions under the Selective Training 
and Service Act of 1940 and came to the Supreme 
Court of the United States by certiorari from 
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denials of writs of habeas corpus in the lower 
courts. The prevailing opinion of Mr. J~stice 
Douglas held that the defendants, having failed 
to take an appeal, could not later have their 
convictions reviewed by a habeas corpus proceed-
ing. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting 
opinion states on p.l85 (U.S.) et. seq, 
"The extent to which this court has 
left itself unhampered by not drawing sharp 
jurisdictional lines, is indicated by the 
following very tentative classification of 
categories in which habeas corpus has not 
been deemed beyond the power of federal 
courts to entertain." 
The Justice then cites eight different sit-
ations, citing many cases and concludes on page 
187 (u.s.), as follows: 
"Perhaps it is well that a writ the 
historic purpose of which is to furnish 
'a swift and imperative remedy in all cases 
of illegal restraint', see Lord Birkenhead, 
L.C., Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. 
O'Brien, (1923) A.C. 6o3, 609, should be 
left fluid and free from the definiteness 
appropriate to ordinary jurisdictional doc-
trines. But if we are to leave the law 
pertaining to habeas corpus in the unsystem-
atized condition in which ·we find it, then 
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I believe it is true of both cases what Judge 
Learned Hand said of the Kulick case, that 
the writ is necessary 1to prevent a complete 
miscarriage of justice•. 157 F 2d. 811, 
813. If the justification need be no more 
definite than the existence of 'exceptional 
circumstances', Bowen v. Johnston, 306 u.s. 
19, 27, the reasons for allowing the writs 
in these cases are more compelling than were 
those in Bowen v. Johnston, where there 
merely appeared 1 to be uncertainty and con-
fusion ••• Whether offenses within the ••• 
National Park are triable in the state or 
federal courts.• •••• " 
Mr. Justice Rutledge, also dissenting, on 
page 187, et seq., states · 
ni am in agreement with Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter in the result and substantially 
in the views he expresses. I would modify 
them by making definite and certain his 
tentatively expressed conclusion that the 
great writ of habeas corpus should not be 
confined by rigidities characterizing or-
dinary jurisdictional doctrines. And I 
agree with Judge Learned Hand, in the view 
stated for the Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Kulick's case, that upon the sum of our 
decisions, regardless of the variety of 
statement in the opinions, no more definite 
rule is to be drawn out than that 'the writ 
is available, not only to determine points 
of jurisdiction, stricti juris, and consti-
tutional questions; but whenever else resort 
to it is necessary to prevent a complete 
miscarriage of justice.' 157 F. 2d 811, 813. 
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"In my opm~on not only is this the law, 
measured by the sum of the decisions and the 
applicable statute, but the aggregate of the 
results demonstrates it should be the law. 
"Confusion in the opinions there is in 
quantity. But is arises in part from the 
effort to pin down what by its nature cannot 
be confined in special, all-inclusive cate-
gories, unless the office of the writ is to 
be diluted or destroyed where that should 
not happen. And so limitation in assertion 
gives way to the necessity for achieving 
the writ's historic purpose when the two 
collide. Admirable as may be the effort 
toward system, this last resort for human 
liberty cannot yield when the choice is be-
tween tolerating its wrongful deprivation 
and maintaining the systematist's art. 
"The writ should be available when-
ever there clearly has been a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice for which no other 
adequate remedy is presently available. Be-
side executing its great object, which is 
the preservation of personal liberty and 
assurance against its wrongful deprivation, 
considerations of economy of judicial time 
and procedures, important as they undoubt-
edly are, become comparatively insignificant. 
This applies to situations involving the 
past existence of a remedy presently fore-
closed, as well as to others where no such 
remedy has every been afforded ••• " 
One of the leading cases on the office of 
the writ of habeas corpus and one which indicates 
that the rule Which scrupulously protects the 
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jurisdiction of courts will yield in the face of 
exceptional circumstances to the power of the 
writ of habeas corpus is BOWEN v. JOHNSTON, 306 
u.s. 19, 59 s. ct. 442 (1939). 
The petitioner had been convicted of murder 
in federal District Court, the act having occurred 
in a National Park in Georgia. He sought a writ 
of habeas corpus on grounds that he had been 
wrongly tried in federal court, the United States 
not having exclusive jurisdiction of the park. 
The court held that the United States ha~ juris-
diction within the park and affirmed the denial 
of the writ. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, however, 
on page 25 {U.S.), considered the rule that 
"Where on the face of the record the District 
Court has jurisdiction of the offense and of 
the defendant and the defendant contends that 
on the facts shown the crime was not committed 
at a place within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, ~·· the judgment is one for review by the 
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Circuit Court of Appeals in error proceedings 
and ••• the writ of habeas corpus is properly 
refused" and on page 26 (u.s.), made the follow-
ing comment: 
·~ut the rule, often broadly stated, 
is not to be taken to mean that the mere 
fact that the court which tried the petition-
er had assumed jurisdiction, necessarily 
deprives another court of authority to grant 
a writ of habeas corpus. As the Court said 
in the case of Coy, supra, pp. 757, 758, the 
broad statement of the rule was certainly 
not intended to go so far as to mean, for 
example, 'that because a federal court tries 
a prisoner for an ordinary common law offense, 
as burglary, assault and battery, or larceny, 
with no averment or proof of any offense 
against the Unites States, or any connection 
with a statute of the United States, and 
punishes him by imprisonment, he cannot be 
released ~ habeas corpus because the court 
which tried him had assumed jurisdiction.' 
Despite the action of the trial court, the 
absence of jurisdiction may appear on the 
face of the record (see In re Snow, supra; 
Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, Supra, P. 183) 
and the remedy of habeas corpus may be 
needed to release the prisoner from a pun-
ishment imposed by a court without juris-
diction to pass judgment. 
"It must never be forgotten that the 
writ of habeas corpus is the precious safe-
guard of personal liberty and there is no 
higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired. 
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Ex parte Lange, supra. The rule requiring 
resort to appellate procedure when the trial 
court has determined its own jurisdiction of 
an offense is not a rule denying the power to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears 
that nevertheless the trial court was with-
out jurisdiction. The rule is not one de-
fining power but one which relates to the 
appropriate exercise of power. It has spec-
ial application where there are essential 
questions of fact determinable by the trial 
court. ·Rodman v. Pothier, supra. It is 
applicable also to the determination in 
ordinary cases of disputed matters of law 
whether they relate to the sufficiency of 
the indictment or to the validity of the 
statute on which the charge is based. Id.; 
Glasgow v. Moyer, supra; Henry v. Henkel, 
supra. But it is equally true that the rule 
is not so inflexible that it may not yield 
to exceptional circumstances where the need 
for the remedy afforded by the writ of 
habeas corpus is apparent." 
In EX PARTE LANGE, 18 Wallace 163, 85 U.S. 
18 (1873), a leading case on double jeopardy and 
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of the United 
States discharged a prisoner on a writ of habeas 
corpus after the district oourt, which had con-
victed him, imposed a second sentence, the first 
sentence imposed having been contrary to statute, 
holding that this resentencing and holding of the 
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prisoner in custody thereunder constituted double 
jeopardy. The court was confronted with the rule 
that a court may set aside or modify its own judg-
ments during the term at which they are made but 
ruled that this power cannot be so used as to 
violate the guarantees of personal rights found 
in the common law, and in the constitutions of 
the States and of the Union. In its opinion dis-
charging the prisoner, the court, Mr. Justice 
Miller writing, said, at page 178: 
"There is no more sacred duty of a court 
than, in a case properly before it, to main-
tain unimpaired those securities for the per-
sonal rights of the individual which have re-
ceived for ages the sanction of the jurist 
and the statesman; and in such cases no nar-
row or illiberal construction should be 
given to the words of the fundamental law 
in which they are embodied." 
Another case of importance on this particular 
question, the rule of which is still the law, is 
EX PARTE IN THE MATTER OF HANS NIELSEN, APPT., 
131 U.S. 176, 9 S. Ct. 672, 33 L. Ed. 118 (1889). 
The petitioner had been convicted of unlawful 
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cohabitation in the Utah Territorial District Court 
and had served his sentence. He was then tried 
and convicted of adultery covering the same period 
of time as for the conviction for unlawful cohab-
itation and involving the same polygamous wife. 
The petitioner filed an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus on the grounds that he had been 
twice convicted for the same offense. The lower 
court refused to give the petitioner any relief 
by habeas corpus on grounds that the judgment of 
conviction, being regular on its face, could not 
be challenged collaterally. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding 
that habeas corpus would lie and did so in a 
unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Bradley. 
The reasoning of the court is as follows: 
rtThe objection to the remedy of habeas 
corpus, of course, would be that there was 
in force a regular judgment of conviction, 
which could not be questioned collaterally, 
as it would have to be on habeas corpus. But 
there are exceptions to this rule which have 
more than once been acted upon by this court. 
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It is firmly established that if the court 
which renders a judgment has not juris-
diction to render it, either because the 
proceedings or the law under which they are 
taken are unconstitutional, or for any other 
reason, the judgment is void and may be 
questioned collaterally, and a defendant 
who is imprisoned under and ~ virtue of it 
may be discharged from custody on habeas 
corpus. This was so decided in the cases 
of EX PARTE LANGE, 85 U. S. 18, and EX PARTE 
SIEBOLD, 100 U.S. 371, and in several other 
cases referred to therein. 
nrn the case of RE SNOW, 120 U. s. 274, 
we held that only one indictment and con-
viction of the crime of unlawful cohabitation, 
under the Act of 1882, could be had for the 
time preceding the indictment because the 
crime was a continuous one and was but a 
single crime until prosecuted; that a second 
conviction and punishment of the same crime 
for any part of said period was an excess 
of authority on the part of the District 
Court of Utah; and that a habeas corpus would 
lie for the discharge of the defendant im-
prisoned on such conviction. • •• It was 
laid down ~ this court in RE COY, 127 U.S. 
731, that the power of Congress to pass a 
statute under which a prisoner is held in 
custody may be inquired into under a writ 
of habeas corpus as affecting the juris-
diction of the court which ordered his im-
prisonment; and the court, speaking by Mr. 
Justice Miller, adds: 'And if their want 
of power appears on the face of the record 
of his condemnation, whether in the in-
dictment or elsewhere, the court which has 
authority to issue the writ is bound to 
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release him ••• 
"In the present case, it is true, the 
ground for the habeas corpus was, not the 
invalidity of an Act of Congress under 
which the defendant was indicted, but a sec-
ond prosecution and trial for the same offense, 
contrary to an express provision of the con-
stitution. In other words, a constitutional 
immunity of the defendant was violated by 
the second trial and judgment. It is diffi-
cult to see why conviction and punishment 
under an unconstitutional law is more vio-
lative of a person's constitutional rights, 
than an unconstitutional conviction and 
punishment under a valid law. In the first 
case, it is true, the court has no authority 
to take cognizance of the case, but, in the 
other, it has no authority to render judgment 
against the defendant. This was the case 
on EX PARTE LANGE where the court had author-
ity to hear and determine the case, but it 
had no authority to give the judgment it did. 
It was the same in the case of Snow: the 
court had authority over the case, but we 
held it had no authority to give judgment 
against the prisoner. He was protected by 
a constitutional provision, securing to 
him a fundamental right. It was not a case 
of mere error in law, but a case of deny-
ing to a person a constitutional right. And 
where such a case appears on the record, the 
party is entitled to be discharged from im-
prisonment. The distinction between the case 
of a mere error in law, and of one in which 
the judgment is void, is pointed out in EX 
PARTE SIEBOLD, and is illustrated by the 
case of EX PARTE PARKS as compared with the 
cases of Lange and Snow. In the case of 
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Parks there was an alleged misconstruction 
of a statute. We held that to be a mere 
error in law, the court having jurisdiction 
of the case. In the cases of Lange and Snow, 
there was a denial or invasion of a consti-
tutional right. A party is entitled to a 
habeas corpus, not merely where the court 
is without jurisdiction of the cause, but 
where it has no constitutional authority 
or power to condemn the prisoner. As 
said by Chief Baron Gilbert in a passage 
quoted in Ex Parte Parks, 93 u.s. 18: 
1If the committment be against law, as be-
ing made by one who had no jurisdiction of 
the cause, or for a matter for which qy law 
no man ought to be punished, the court are 
to discharge.• This was said in reference 
to cases which had gone to conviction and 
sentence. Lord Hale laid down the same 
doctrine in almost the same words. (2 Hale 
P.C. 144). ~nd why should not such a rule 
prevail in favorem libertatis? If we have 
seemed to hold the contrary in any case, 
it has been from inadvertance. The law 
could hardly be stated with more categori-
cal accuracy than it is in the opening sent-
ence of EX PARTE WILSON, 114 U.S. 417, where 
Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, 
said: 1 It is well settled by a series of 
decisions that this court, having no juris-
diction of criminal cases by writ of error 
or appeal, cannot discharge on habeas corpus 
a person imprisoned under the sentence of 
a circuit or district court in a criminal 
case unless the sentence exceeds +he juris-
diction of that court, or there is no au-
thority to hold him under that sentence.• 
This proposition, it is true, relates to 
the power of this court to discharge on 
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habeas corpus persons sentenced by the circuit 
and district courts; but with regard to the 
power of discharging on habeas corpus, it is 
generally true that, after conviction and 
sentence, the writ only lies when the sentence 
exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, or 
there is no authority to hold the defendant 
under it. In the present case, the sentence 
given was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, 
because.it was against an express prov1s1on 
of the constitution, which bounds and limits 
all jurisdiction. tt 
A Utah case which goes into the broad nature 
of the writ of habeas corpus and which indicates 
that the rule contended for by the Appellants will 
yield to exceptional circumstanres is THOMPSON v. 
HARRIS, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. (2d) 761 (1943). The 
cases involved sentences under the Habitual 
Criminal Act and the applicability of the Indeter-
minate Sentence Law and came before the court on 
applications for writs of habeas corpus. Mr. 
Chief Justice 1>/olfe in his opinion denying the 
writs, at page 766 (P.), dealt with the question 
of the scope of review on habeas corpus as follows: 
"It is often stated that the scope of 
review on habeas corpus is limited to the 
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examination of the jurisdiction of the court 
whose judgment of conviction is questioned. 
We must never lose sight, however, of the 
fact that habeas corpus is the precious 
safeguard of personal liberty. That juris-
dictional questions only are reachable by 
the writ is not such an inflexible rule as 
cannot yield to exceptional circumstances. 
It may be better to say that the rule which 
apparently limits the scope of the writ to 
jurisdictional questions is not a rule of 
limitation, but a rule of defining the 
the appropriate spheres in which the power 
should be exercised. Thus it has been held 
that the writ will lie if the petitioner has 
been deprived of one of his constitutional 
rights such as due process of law. See 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 
1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357; 
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S. Ct. 
442, 83 L. Ed. 455." 
If the abuse is sufficiently great a court 
may by habeas corpus relieve from an unlawful 
restraint even in cases where on the face of the 
record of the restraining court all things were 
in order. That such a use of the writ of habeas 
corpus requires exceptional circumstances is 
certainly true, but just as true is it that when 
such circumstances exist the power of the courts 
in exercising the great writ is such that it will 
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cut quickly and cleanly through the narrow rules 
ordinarily restricting its use and will restore 
liberty unjustly restrained. 
As pointed out in the argument under Point 2, 
and by the cases therein discussed, the District 
Court in the instant case, by virtue of its own 
jurisdiction and not by interference with the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, and by the 
very nature of this case, had certain duties 
imposed upon it which required it to place the cus-
tody of these children so that their best interests 
would be served. The parents sought the children. 
Their desires were opposed by the State Department 
of Public Welfare which claimed the right to cus-
tody. The District Court had to decide the facts 
and determine the issues. In so doing it acted 
properly within its own jurisdiction. 
The District Court could not escape the ob-
ligation of determining the question of custody. 
Its duty to do so in a case of this nature is not 
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a duty peculiar to courts of this State. In 
California the proper disposition of the chil-
dren must be made by the court in addition to 
deciding the legality of the restraint. A case 
pointing this out is EX PARTE McDANIEL, 90 Cal. 
App. 307, 265 P. 884 (1928). The mother of chil-
dren had failed in an attempt to obtain their 
custody by habeas corpus, the court below in that 
action having awarded the custody to their aunt. 
The District Court of Appeals had before it the 
question of the duty of the court below, having 
the question of custody of minors before it, to 
award that custody as it saw fit. The court 
considered the question and stated, as follows: 
"It thus appears that, notwithstanding 
the main feature of the proceeding was the 
question of the legal right of the respondent 
to the custody of the children, in effect a 
judicial determination was had of what pos-
sibly might be termed the subsidiary or 
dependent question of the proper disposition 
to be made of the children. While ordinarily 
it may be said that the function of the writ 
of habeas corpus is to determine only the 
legality of the detention of a person under 
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restraint of his liberty (13 Cal. Jur. 217, 
and note), in cases involving the custody of 
infants, the rule seems to be relaxed and 
extended so that the determination of the 
matter may include an order looking to the 
best interests of the children (13 Cal. Jr. 
279). 11 
A similar rule is pronounced by the Maine 
Court in MERCHANT v. BUSSELL, 139 Me.ll8, 27 A. 
(2d) 816 (1942). The case involved a custody 
fight between a grandmother, in whose care a minor 
child had been left, and the father, who sought 
custody. The court below denied the father's 
request and awarded custody to the grandmother. 
The father objected to the court's awarding of 
custody, contending that its only jurisdiction 
was to order a release or refuse to do so. The 
court said, on page 818 (A), 
"A writ of habeas corpus is ordinarily 
a proper remedy for a parent who claims to 
have been unlawfully deprived of the custody 
of a child. Generally speaking, the object 
of a writ of habeas corpus is to release one 
from an illegal restraint. In the case of 
an adult, who may go his own way, no more is 
required. An infant of tender years must, 
however, be in the custody of someone, and 
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to do no more than order a release would as 
a rule be a futility. In such cases courts 
have accordingly gone farther and have enter-
ed orders providing for custody." 
The New York courts follow the rule, as in-
dicated by PEOPLE EX REL KLEE v. KLEE, 195 N.Y.S. 
778 (1922). The court considered the question 
of the power of a court on habeas corpus involving 
a minor to award custody by looking into the history 
of the use of the writ in such cases. On page 
780, the court states: 
"When as early as 1819, the writ was 
issued to obtain the custody of a child, it 
was granted by Chancellor Kent, who observed 
that - 1the object of the court was to re-
lease the infant from all improper restraint, 
and not to try in this summary way, the ques-
tion of guardianship, or to deliver the infant 
over t0 the custody of another; that the course 
and practice of the courts in these cases was 
only to deliver the party from illegal re-
straint, and if competent to form and declare 
an election, then to allow the infant to go 
where she pleased, and if the infant be too 
young to form a judgment, then the court is 
to exercise its judgment for the infant.' 
Matter of Wollstonecraft, 4 Johns. Ch. 80." 
The rule is recognized by the Virginia Court 
in BUCHANAN v. BUCHANAN, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426, 
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116 A.L.R. 688 (1938). The court considered the 
nature of habeas corpus in these cases as follows 
(page 691, A.L.R.): 
"The primary object of habeas corpus is 
to determine the legality of the restraint 
under which a person is held. As applied to 
infants, the primary object is to determine 
in whose custody the best interests of the 
infants will probably be advanced. In deter-
mining such custody, the natural rights of 
the parents are entitled to due consideration. 
'By immemorial tradition the aim of habeas 
corpus is a justice that is swift and sum-
mary' • • • 
"In Armstrong v. Stone and Wife, 9 Grat. 
102, 50 Va. 102 the court said: • ••• Whilst, 
therefore, it is undoubtedly true that the 
proper office of the writ is to release from 
illegal restraint, and, where the party is of 
years of discretion and sui juris, nothing 
more is done than to discharge him; yet, if 
he be not of an age to determine for himself, 
the court or judge must decide for him, and 
make an order for his being placed in the 
proper custody. ' " 
The District Court simply followed the well-
recognized rule and performed the duties imposed 
upon it thereby , being very careful to refrain 
from depriving the Juvenile Court of what the 
Appellants, on page 9 of their brief, refer to as 
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"its continuing jurisdiction over the children 
previously acquired by that court under authority 
of Section 55-10-5 (3), U.C.A. 1953." 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court in its handling of this 
matter proceeded properly in all respects. That 
court was charged with certain obligations, hav-
ing before it children whose custody was in dis-
pute. Those obligations it performed in complete 
accord with the law in cases of this nature. The 
nature of the proceeding as in habeas corpus re-
quired the court to decide whether the children 
were illegally restrained. Having decided that 
they were illegally restrained, the District Court, 
under the doctrine of the cases, had to decide who 
should have custody of the children. Since their 
parents sought custody, the District Court was re-
quired to determine the fitness of the parents. 
To do so, it heard testimony, made findings of fact 
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and conclusions of law, all of which was within 
its jurisdiction. The findings of fact and con-
elusions of law compelled the District Court to 
restore the custody of these children to their par-
ents, which restoration it made on certain conditions, 
being careful not to disturb the continuing juris-
diction of the Juvenile Court. 
We cannot conclude with the Appellants that 
the discharge of the children "would have accomplish-
ed the object of, and satisfied the purpose of, the 
writ of habeas corpus." In restoring the custody 
of the children to the parents, the District Court, 
acted within its jurisdiction and in complete ac-
cord with law governing the type of case it had 
before it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HORACE J. KNOWLTON 
ROBERT J. SCHUM 
Attorneys for Respondents 
214 Tenth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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